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Insider fraud and Routine Activity Theory:  
A Thought Experiment 
 
 
Spyridon Samonas 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines three scenarios of insider fraud based on empirical data from 
an upper-tier budget hotel in London, as part of a thought experiment on insider 
fraud. The scenarios are presented in the form of crime scripts and are reviewed 
under the theoretical framework of the Routine Activity Approach, which is widely 
used in crime science. The discussion that follows reflects on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the Routine Activity Approach and raises wider issues and concerns 
relating to information security, such as the adoption and implementation of 
controls against the insider threat. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past few years an assortment of government (Cappelli et al., 2009; Cummings 
et al., 2012) and not-for-profit organisations (CIFAS, 2012), as well as professional 
services firms (E&Y, 2012; PwC, 2012), have been releasing reports on information 
security or fraud that consistently highlight issues pertaining to computer-enabled 
fraud. According to PwC’s (2012) latest Information Security Breaches Survey (ISBS) 
53% of large and 12% of small organisations in a sample of 447 respondents 
reported an incident of theft or fraud involving computers between February-March 
2011 and 2012. Confirming the popular assertion that insider fraud spiked during 
global financial downturn (2009), computer-enabled theft and fraud instigated by 
staff tripled between 2008 and 2010, and have remained at historically high levels 
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ever since despite substantial investments in security awareness training (ibid)1. In 
large organisations this type of fraud has doubled over the last two years, whereas in 
small businesses it is still relatively rare, albeit several times more common than in 
2008 (ibid).  
 
However, information security expenditure against insider fraud and theft remains a 
low priority. Analysing data from 743 Information Technology (IT) professionals, the 
recent report on insider fraud conducted by the Ponemon Institute (2013) shows 
that only 44% of them say their organization views the prevention of insider fraud as 
a top security priority; and that such perception has actually declined since 2011. In 
the latest Global Information Security Survey conducted by Ernst & Young (2012), 
out of the 1,836 respondents only 18% would be spending more on forensics and 
fraud support over the next year, 7% would be spending less, and a whopping 75% 
reported that they would be spending the same. Despite fraud featuring in the top-
five of threats and vulnerabilities that have most increased the risk exposure of the 
respondents over the last year prior to the survey, it scores slightly below the middle 
of the list of top information security priorities over the next year (E&Y, 2012). In a 
similar vein, PwC’s latest ISBS indicates that protecting other assets, such as cash, 
from fraud is the least important driver for information security expenditure – in 
fact, only 1% of the respondents considered protection from theft as the main driver 
(PwC, 2012).  
 
Insiders are responsible for some of the biggest frauds ever recorded (NFA, 2012). 
Insider fraud is presumably costing organisations all over the world billions of US 
dollars in damages every year (Hoyer et al., 2012). One of the major difficulties of 
studying insider fraud is that it is underreported, and so its financial impact on 
organisations can only be loosely estimated (NFA, 2012). Consequently all relevant 
studies and reports are based on limited data, mostly because cyber incidents are 
usually not revealed when discovered, and so it is difficult to pinpoint their 
                                                        
1 Throughout this paper ibid is used to direct the reader to the immediately preceding reference or footnote 
citation. 
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frequency, impact or root causes (CIFAS, 2012; Dekker et al., 2012). This not only 
adversely affects the credibility of insider fraud studies, but also impedes policy 
making at a national and international level. 
 
Information security scholars and practitioners often argue that people are the first 
line of defense, but they are also are the main cause of security breaches (Angell and 
Samonas, 2009; Pironti, 2013; Samonas and Angell, 2010; Samonas, 2012). In this 
respect one of the biggest threats to information security is not the latest variation 
of some new malware that exploits technical vulnerabilities, rather, the malicious 
actions or inadvertent errors of trusted employees (Pironti, 2013) that operate 
‘inside the firewall’ (Warkentin and Willison, 2009). This is mainly due to the fact 
that the controls and tools employed to protect organisations against external 
threats are inherently insufficient to address the insider threat (Schultz, 2002; 
Theoharidou et al., 2005). As Warketin et al (2009) note, the insider threat is, in 
many cases, disregarded “in a rush to protect the perimeter with ever-increasingly 
sophisticated perimeter controls”. Being a subset of the insider threat, insider fraud 
is nowadays more relevant than ever (Hoyer et al., 2012), especially considering that 
people are becoming increasingly creative in the use of computers and networks as 
enablers for traditional fraud schemes (Lincke and Green, 2012; NFA, 2012). 
 
This paper draws on the Routine Activity Approach to discuss three scenarios of 
insider fraud as part of a thought experiment in a budget hotel in London. Each of 
these scenarios is presented with the help of a ‘crime script’ (Willison, 2006; Willison 
and Backhouse, 2006), and refers to the manipulation of cash bookings within the 
hotel’s reservations system. 
 
2. Insider threat and fraud in cyber-crime 
Dhillon et al (2004) argue that computer-related crime is a ubiquitous variant of all 
crime. In this respect, the term ‘cyber-crime’ is commonly used as an overarching 
concept that encompasses so many different actions and incidents pertaining to 
crime.  Citing Newman (2009), Hartel et al (2010) provide a comprehensive definition 
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of cyber-crime as “behaviour in which computers or networks are a tool, a target, or 
a place of criminal activity”. Drawing on Furnell (2002), Yar (2005) suggests that 
cyber-crime can be distinguished into ‘computer-assisted’ and ‘computer-focused’ 
crime. The former type of crime includes ‘traditional crime’ that pre-dated the 
Internet and is still being committed with the help of computers (Hartel et al., 2010), 
such as fraud, theft or money laundering (Yar, 2005). The latter type refers to the 
‘criminogenic’ features of computers and networks (Hartel et al., 2010), and 
specifically to those crimes that essentially have a parasitic relationship with 
technology and the Internet, such as hacking or viral attacks (Yar, 2005). From a legal 
standpoint, cyber-deception and theft that involves stealing money or property is 
only one of the categories of cyber-crime along with cyber-trespass, cyber-
pornography and cyber-violence (Wall, D., 2001 cited in Yar, 2005).  
  
The focus of this paper is on insider threat and insider fraud that are computer-
assisted and can be classified under cyber-deception and theft. At a conceptual level, 
insider threats mainly refer to the intent of dishonest employees to commit some 
form of cyber-crime (Dhillon and Moores, 2001; Warkentin and Willison, 2009; 
Willison and Backhouse, 2006), as opposed to external threats that are attributed to 
hackers and viruses, or acts of God, such as flooding and earthquakes (Willison and 
Backhouse, 2006). Perhaps the first distinction between external and internal (or 
else insider) threats to computer systems appears the late 1980s when Denning 
(1987) formulated an intrusion-detection model to identify attempted system break-
ins by outsiders, as well as abuse by insiders who misuse their privileges (Hartel et 
al., 2010).  
 
Warkentin et al (2009) and Hartel et al (2010) suggest that there is a significant body 
of Information Security literature that deals with insider threats that essentially 
ranges from Denning’s (1987) seminal paper to the work of Dhillon, Backhouse, and 
most recently to Willison’s research on opportunities for computer crime and crime 
prevention techniques (Dhillon, 1999; Dhillon and Moores, 2001; Dhillon et al., 2004; 
Warkentin and Willison, 2009; Willison, 2003, 2006; Willison and Backhouse, 2006). 
Loch et al (1992) develop a taxonomy of computer system threats based on the 
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distinction between external and internal threats. Each of the two main types of 
threats is split into human and non-human, which in turn are further branched into 
intentional and accidental. An updated taxonomy developed by Warkentin (1995) 
includes a distinction between low-grade and high-grade threats, with the latter 
being a malicious individual or organisation that seeks to exploit vulnerabilities and 
maintain intrusions towards maximising long-term gain (Warkentin and Willison, 
2009).  
 
In an attempt to assess the effectiveness of ISO17799 on insider threats, 
Theoharidou (2005) presents an overview of the different classifications of insider 
threats that appear in the relevant literature, and which are based on a variety of 
criteria, such as the type of access that the insider has or the aims, intentionality and 
technical expertise of the insider. As with much of the terminology examined in 
information systems research, there is an abundance of definitions attached to 
insider threat (Cappelli et al., 2009; Cummings et al., 2012; Schultz, 2002; Silowash et 
al., 2012; Theoharidou et al., 2005; Willison, 2006). Quoting Greitzer et al (2010), 
Hoyer et al (2012) consider insider threat as the departure of human behaviour from 
compliance with security policies, irrespective of whether this is the result of malice 
or simply disregard for said policies. However, Cappelli et al (2009) provide a more 
elaborate definition that is both sufficient and suitable for the purposes of this 
paper: 
 
“A malicious insider threat to an organization is a current or former employee, 
contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to an 
organization's network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that 
access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the organization's information or information systems.” 
 
It appears that Capelli et al (ibid) have truly captured the changing character of 
information security in the above definition. Over the past few years the concept of 
the ‘insider’ has become somewhat restricted, and in many cases irrelevant due to 
the fact that privileged access to the assets of an organisation is given to employees, 
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volunteers, consultants and contractors (Brancik, 2007; NFA, 2012; Ponemon, 2013). 
Access is also given to business partners or fellow members of a strategic alliance, 
whereas contractors nowadays include employees of a Cloud Service Provider, which 
is a fairly new and different contractual relationship compared to outsourcing (Hartel 
et al., 2010). Thus a more sophisticated and prudent alternative to the term ‘insider’ 
would be a ‘(person with) specialised access’ (ibid).    
 
In fact, insider threat comprises Intellectual Property theft, IT sabotage, fraud, 
espionage, and accidental insider threats (Silowash et al., 2012). The difference 
between fraud and theft within this classification of insider threats is relatively 
straightforward. However, fraud and theft are two terms that are often misused and 
treated as synonymous, even though they are not. In the UK legislation, there is a 
clear line between theft and fraud. Under the Theft Act 1968, a person is guilty of 
theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention 
of permanently depriving the other of it, either with a view to gain or for the thief’s 
own benefit. The Fraud Act 2006 eventually repealed certain provisions regarding 
theft of property by deception, which essentially formed the basis of the revision of 
the Theft Act in 1978. According to the Fraud Act 2006, there are three main types of 
fraud; namely fraud by false representation, failing to disclose information, and 
abuse of position. The latter type, which is directly pertinent to the scope of this 
paper, refers to breaches where a person dishonestly abuses a position of 
employment to make a gain for him/herself or another; or to cause loss to another 
or to expose another to a risk of loss. Interestingly, the law may regard that a person 
has abused his/her position, even though his/her conduct consisted of an omission 
rather than an act of commission. 
 
In the U.S., the first law on computer fraud was the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
of 1984, which evolved into the Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 1030 federal law that 
governs computer-enabled fraudulent activity. Section 1030 punishes any 
intentional, unauthorized access to ‘protected’ computers, namely computers that 
are used by financial institutions, the federal government, or in foreign or interstate 
commercial and communication activities (Brancik, 2007). 
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Following a distinction similar to the one applied to threats, fraud can be divided into 
external and internal fraud, depending on whether or not the perpetrator is an 
employee (Lincke and Green, 2012). Insider fraud is generally considered a subset of 
the insider threat problem (Hoyer et al., 2012). The underlying theme in many 
definitions of insider fraud (ACFE, 2012; Cappelli et al., 2009; Cummings et al., 2012; 
Lincke and Green, 2012; Silowash et al., 2012), is the abuse of trust or position for 
personal gain as illustrated in the Fraud Act 2006. Such abuse can take different 
forms, such as corruption, asset misappropriation, and financial statement fraud, 
and implies that the insider has access to the organisation’s assets and systems, and 
even the ability to influence the outcomes of organisational processes (ACFE, 2012).  
 
With the use of IT as a fraud enabler in mind, Silowash et al (2012) define insider 
fraud “an insider’s use of IT for the unauthorized modification, addition, or deletion 
of an organization’s data (not programs or systems) for personal gain, or theft of 
information that leads to an identity crime (e.g., identity theft or credit card fraud)”. 
In a similar vein, Cummings et al (2012) consider a malicious insider as capable for 
disrupting operations, corrupting data, exfiltrating sensitive information, or generally 
compromising an IT system, causing loss or damage. 
 
The next sections presents an overview of the Routine Activity Approach, which is 
the primary theoretical perspective used in this research. 
 
3. The Routine Activity Approach  
The Routine Activity Approach (RAA) is a sociological theoretical perspective that 
was developed by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson in their effort to explain 
criminal trends in the United States between 1947 and 1974 as a result of changes in 
labour force participation and single-adult households (Cohen and Felson, 1979). 
RAA has been instrumental in informing Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) 
techniques (Theoharidou et al., 2005; Willison, 2006; Willison and Backhouse, 2006), 
and has been widely used in Crime Science – which, in contrast to Criminology, 
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studies incidents and the short-term motives of offenders, and not their personality 
or social background (Hartel et al., 2010; Theoharidou et al., 2005).  
 
The theory suggests that the organisation of routine activities in everyday life 
constructs ‘variable opportunity structures for successful predation’ (Yar, 2005). The 
conceptual framework of the theory consists of ‘three minimal elements of direct-
contact predatory violations’ (Cohen and Felson, 1979), which were originally 
conceived to address violent assaults, or crimes where one person takes or damages 
the property of another (Willison and Backhouse, 2006). The three elements involve 
(1) a potential offender, (2) a suitable target and (3) the absence of capable 
guardians (see Fig. 1). These elements could be considered as three sufficient and 
necessary conditions for a crime to be committed, since it is their spatial and 
temporal convergence that gives rise to opportunity for crime. By implication the 
theory implies that a crime does not occur when there is lack of even one of these 
elements (ibid).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Application of Routine Activity Theory in Crime 
Source: (Choo, 2011) 
 
Yar (2005) presents a succinct description of the core assumptions of RAA:  
 
“Thus, at a general level, the theory requires that targets, offenders and 
guardians be located in particular places, that measurable relations of 
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spatial proximity and distance pertain between those targets and potential 
offenders, and that social activities be temporally ordered according to 
rhythms such that each of these agents is either typically present or absent 
at particular times.” 
 
One other important aspect of RAA is the assumption that there are always 
motivated offenders at hand inclined to commit crime should a favourable 
opportunity present itself. Rational choice theory has clearly influenced RAA, which 
also assumed that motivated offenders carry out a risk assessment prior to 
committing a crime by calculating the anticipated benefits, costs and risks involved 
(Choo, 2011; Willison and Backhouse, 2006; Yar, 2005). For instance, the suitability 
of a target can be estimated according to its fourfold constituent properties that are 
usually rendered in the acronym VIVA (Value, Inertia, Visibility and Accessibility) and 
that refer to two of the elements of RAA (Hartel et al., 2010; Yar, 2005), namely the 
lack of capable guardians and finding a window of opportunity to strike at a target.  
 
Quoting Tseloni et al (2004), Yar (2005) defines guardianship as ‘the capability of 
persons and objects to prevent crime from occurring’. In RAA, the role of guardians is 
crucial, either through a direct intervention that acts as a deterrent, or by merely 
staying in close proximity to the target, thus reminding the potential offender that 
someone is watching vigilantly (ibid). In the context of computer-assisted cyber-
crime, capable guardians usually take the form of internal controls. Indeed, the 
different kinds of controls that can be employed to safeguard organisations against 
insider cyber-criminal activity have been extensively discussed in the information 
security literature (Willison and Backhouse, 2006). Dhillon et al (2001) make a 
distinction between technical, formal and informal controls drawing on the TFI 
model (Samonas, 2012). Technical controls are the most traditional and mostly 
address issues pertaining to access management (Dhillon and Moores, 2001; 
Willison, 2006). Formal controls usually involve rule-following, and may relate to 
regulatory compliance as well as to compliance with prescribed organisational 
processes (ibid) and information security policies. Finally, informal controls mainly 
refer to the provision of an all-round information security education and to the 
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cultivation of a security culture, within which obedience is valued and incident 
reporting is positively encouraged (Furnell and Thomson, 2009). Dhillon et al (2001) 
stress the importance of striking the right balance between controls while noting 
that in many cases computer-assisted crimes occur when a current employee 
circumvents existing controls. 
 
Quite often, organisations fall victims of their employees because they fail to take 
information security seriously, and so in this way they ultimately create security 
loopholes that are ready to be exploited by insiders. The following table summarises 
the eight factors that, according to Willison et al (2006), lead to the formation of 
opportunity structures for crime in organisations (see Fig. 2). 
 
RAA operates at a societal or organisational level and one of the main question that 
it poses is how to minimise opportunities for crime within the context of the routine 
activities of potential offenders (Hartel et al., 2010; Lincke and Green, 2012). Hartel 
et al (2010) propose the adoption of five principles of opportunity reduction, which 
essentially refer to the three main elements of the theory; some of these principles 
also appear in the work of Choo (2011) and Lincke et al (2012). The principles include 
the increase in the effort and risks of crime, the reduction of the potential rewards 
and the provocations that invite criminal behaviour, and finally the removal of 
excuses for criminal behaviour.  
 
Factors leading to deficient security Description 
Organisational complacency towards IS 
security 
Failure of some organisations to implement 
even the most basic controls, leaving their 
systems vulnerable 
Erroneous perceptions of IS security risks 
Measures may be implemented to address 
risks that in reality are relatively minor, at 
the expense of those areas where the risks 
are high but receive little attention 
Technical perspective of IS security 
The ‘distorted image’ of security held by 
managers is often equated with a myopic 
understanding of the problem area and how 
it should be addressed 
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Funding of IS security 
The technical perspective often leads to a 
poor return on investment owing to the 
inability of those responsible for security to 
understand and address the necessary and 
related managerial aspects of security (e.g. 
implementing a security policy), while they 
concentrate too heavily on technical 
safeguards 
The inter-related nature of security controls 
Security is very much like a house of cards: 
inadequate consideration for one area will 
impact on another, possibly creating those 
conditions that help to form an opportunity 
Implementation of inappropriate controls 
If the safeguards introduced provide an 
inadequate level of security then the IS will 
be left vulnerable. However, the same is also 
true if the safeguards are perceived by staff 
as unworkable in the organisational context 
Safeguard implementation 
Poor implementation can negate any 
improvements in security for which a 
safeguard was designed 
Compliance reviews 
Many organisations fail to check whether 
their controls are operating as intended. As a 
consequence those safeguards which are 
failing to perform leave an IS vulnerable 
Fig. 2: Opportunity formation through deficient security 
Source: (Willison and Backhouse, 2006) 
 
Finally, in terms of assessing its practical contribution, RAA as a subset of SCP has 
proven to be suitable for addressing the insider threat (Willison, 2006). Choo (2011) 
asserts that RAA is an all-encompassing theoretical lens for cyber-crime studies. 
However, Yar (2005) argues that, while appropriate for the use of computer-assisted 
cyber-crime, RAA falls short in explaining issues that pertain to computer-enabled 
cyber-crime due to the novel way in which socio-interactional activities take place in 
the virtual environments of cyberspace. Indeed, despite attempts to enhance the 
conceptual framework of the theory so that it addresses contemporary aspects of 
crime by adding new elements, such as the ‘intimate handler’ or the ‘crime 
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facilitators or dis-inhibitors’ (Willison and Backhouse, 2006), RAA seems to be fully 
applicable only to terrestrial cyber-crimes. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
This research paper reflects on empirical data that were gathered by the author 
between November 2012 and January 2013, during his assignment as Deputy Front-
of-House Manager in a 160-bed ‘upper-tier’ budget hotel in London (Roper and 
Carmouche, 1989). The data refer to standard organisational processes and 
regulatory compliance procedures, and were used to construct three hypothetical 
cases of insider computer-assisted fraud. The three cases were emulated on the 
hotel’s computerised reservations system operating in the training mode. The result 
was that all three fraud schemes were viable. 
  
Each scenario refers to hotel bookings paid in cash and on the day of check-in. It is 
assumed that the offender is an insider with advanced user privileges higher than 
say a receptionist, for instance a Deputy Front-of-House Manager, Shift Leader, or 
Duty Manager. Also, one major underlying assumption that is fairly reasonable to 
make is that accountants and internal auditors are not expected to access any 
particular bookings or the user logs attached to them for that matter, with one 
notable exception: when bookings have either a positive (guest or group has 
underpaid), or a negative (guest or group has overpaid) balance in the respective 
ledger accounts upon checkout. This is a quite common phenomenon considering 
the sheer volume of bookings placed with a hotel, and could be called the ‘zero 
balance trap’. The bookings outside the ‘zero balance trap’ turn up in many reports 
as outstanding, and so tampering with their accounts is extremely likely to be 
detected – unless, of course, the ‘guardians’ have been compromised in some way 
and there is widespread collaboration and conspiracy for fraud inside the 
organisation.  
 
The presentation of the findings can be broadly classified as a thought experiment, in 
that it is a narrative of an experimental situation that is explicitly constructed in 
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order to destroy or challenge the current paradigmatic position, or to support an 
emerging paradigmatic position (Introna and Whitley, 2000). Because of obvious 
moral and ethical concerns (ibid) the three scenarios discussed here were only 
emulated and not attempted in practice. They only aim at challenging the existing 
organizational paradigm of the hotel and its current modi operandi with regard to 
the creation of security loopholes through deficient information security.  
 
The detailed activity entailed in each scenario is presented with the help of a crime 
script, which is based on the fundamental premise that any crime consists of a series 
of stages (Willison and Siponen, 2009). The separation of a crime into distinct stages 
seems to have considerable analytical utility in the case of computer-assisted crimes. 
More specifically, criminal activity can occur at the input, throughput or output 
stages (Dhillon, 1999; Dhillon et al., 2004). Input crimes are committed when a rogue 
employee enters false or manipulated information into a computer system. 
Throughput crimes epitomize the ‘low and slow’ approach (Cummings et al., 2012), 
or what is widely known as ‘salami slicing’ (Dhillon, 1999), which refers to small 
amounts being taken off a large number of accounts and then directed to a separate 
account that belongs or is controlled by the offender. These crimes are committed 
throughout a prolonged period of time, during which the offender tries to avoid 
raising any eyebrows with his actions and stays ‘below the radar’; hence, the ‘low 
and slow’ attribute. Finally, output crimes are relatively unsophisticated and 
committed by concealing or misusing bogus inputs, or by postponing detection (ibid). 
Interestingly, manifestations of almost all of the aforementioned categories of crime 
(input, throughput and output) appear in each of the three crime scripts that are 
examined in this paper. 
 
Crime scripts focus on the operational aspects of crime and they were originally 
developed to help in the design of more sophisticated SCP techniques (Willison and 
Backhouse, 2006; Willison and Siponen, 2009). By analysing the flow of criminal 
thought and activity, crime scripts can help policy makers and practitioners identify 
blind spots and crystallise patterns of malicious actions, in an effort to develop more 
robust and effective internal audit controls. Within the context of RAA, crime scripts 
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can pinpoint flaws in existing security control measures, help compile a list of 
potential targets; but most of all, they can examine a wide range of opportunities for 
fraud that vary in sophistication, risk and difficulty of execution. It is a pragmatic way 
of looking at fraud as it focuses on the conception and execution of a fraud scheme 
from the perspective of the offender. The format of each crime scripts presented 
here follows the general script that appears in the work of Willison (2006) and 
Willison et al (2006); the first column represents the stage in the script, and with 
each stage comes a corresponding behaviour.  
 
In terms of the technological aspect of the scenarios, the computerised reservations 
system used in the hotel is a widely used, scalable system that can cover the whole 
spectrum of the hotel industry, and therefore, it can also accommodate the needs of 
smaller and/or lower-end hotel units or hotel chains. However, customizing the 
software to suit the needs of a large, but low-end, hotel was a highly demanding task 
that appears to have created all sorts of complications in the overall use of the 
system. Most notably, it seems that the alignment of the business processes of the 
hotel together with the processes inscribed in the system by its developers requires 
considerable effort on the part of the hotel staff, and the top management in 
particular. Although standard hotel operations, such as the back- and front-offices, 
are indeed very similar in most hotels, they are not and they cannot be exactly the 
same across the entire hotel industry. Before going ‘live’, the particular system 
underwent extensive customization according to the special needs of the hotel in 
order to be brought to an operable state; that is, in a position to handle the main 
bulk of the hotel’s operations.  
 
During the customization process, many features of the system were deemed 
unnecessary and they were, therefore, disabled. Some of the features that were 
retained and used proved to be particularly helpful in the day-to-day operations of 
the hotel. For example, the reception staff can simultaneously check in and out a 
group of guests on the system, provided that all the members of the group arrive 
and depart together. Indeed this has saved much time and effort, since in the 
previous reservation system every single guest of the hotel had to be individually 
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checked in and out, regardless of whether they were part of a group reservation or 
not.  
 
Scenario no.1 
The first scenario is rather simple and, to a certain extent, naïve in conception; and it 
entails a high level of risk of discovery for the perpetrator. It revolves around the use 
of reverse or adjustment postings in guest ledger or Accounts/Receivable (A/R) 
accounts, with the latter being the accounts primarily used for group bookings. 
Certain groups pay any outstanding balances, sometimes after their check out day, 
depending on the arrangements they have with the hotel - hence, the need for an 
A/R account.  
 
According to the scenario, the offender manipulates the input of cash payments they 
receive for bookings, whilst trying to withhold, rather than hand to the customer, 
any receipts automatically generated by the computerised reservations system upon 
settling the payment. In that way, the payment is noted on the system in the first 
place, and then reversed or partially adjusted, so the offender can fairly easily pocket 
the cash that is left outside the safe deposit box.  
 
For instance, a guest pays £100 in cash for a booking. The offender takes the 
payment settles it on the system and then fully or partially undoes the settlement of 
the payment, as if no payment was received for that particular booking. If the 
customer does not ask for a receipt, they cannot prove that they have paid in cash 
and may be asked to pay again! The major drawback of this scenario is that reverse 
and adjustment postings, also known as negative postings, always appear in banking 
reconciliation and the end-of-day (night audit) sequence reports that run early in the 
day, so that the system can generate charges for all in-house guests and roll out to a 
new ‘business day’. Negative postings can only be performed by users with advanced 
privileges and usually raise a red flag. Consequently, in that case, middle and senior 
management and accountants can enquire why the postings were made and who 
authorised them. In view of the above, the crime script would read as follows (see 
Fig. 3). 
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Stage Script Action Situational Control 
Preparation 
Deliberately gaining 
access to the organisation 
Pre-employment screening 
Entry Authorised as employee - 
Pre-condition 
Look for cash bookings 
Advanced user privileges 
Better screening of who gets 
advanced privileges and why. 
Periodic review of all users with 
high user privileges. 
Instrumental pre-
condition 
Process check-in of cash 
bookings by the offender 
Segregation of duties; staggered 
breaks 
Instrumental initiation 
Access the reservations 
system; receive cash 
payment 
Password use for performing 
certain actions in the system 
Instrumental 
actualization 
Apply negative posting 
Password required for performing 
this action; system prompting the 
user to indicate authoriser 
Doing 
Keep the amount of cash 
that is not going to be 
settled on the system  
- 
Post-condition 
Put the amount of cash 
settled on the system (if 
any) in an envelope and 
in the hotel’s drop safe 
Amount has to be double-checked 
and signed for by a colleague 
Exit Log out of system  
Check the negative postings 
report in the end-of-day 
sequence; access the user log of 
the booking in question 
Fig. 3: Crime script for negative postings scenario 
Adapted from: (Willison and Backhouse, 2006) 
 
Scenario no.2 
The second scenario is based on the manipulation of room rates and applies only to 
those bookings that are not automatically placed on the system through an Online 
Travel Agent (OTA). It has moderate risk and medium to high financial reward. Upon 
placing a booking on the system, the end-user must select an agent to designate 
where the booking comes from and then a rate for the booking; so that the guest is 
charged for the nights they stay in the hotel. The rates are given ‘code names’ that 
summarise their properties; for example, the rate code ‘HOTELCOM5’ may reflect 
the special rate that a hotel gives to bookings coming from Hotels.com for stays over 
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5 nights. In this case, the agent would be the OTA named Hotels.com. Each agent can 
be associated with an assortment of rate codes that reflect the base rate, as well as a 
variety of other rates for different periods of time and other special circumstances 
(for example, special discounts for Bank Holiday weekends etc). Selecting the right 
agent and rate is essential, since the agent field is used to calculate the revenue that 
comes from a particular agent, and by extension, the commission that the hotel will 
need to pay to them. In short, a single rate code associated with a particular agent 
gets attached to every booking.  
 
Rate manipulations works as follows. Prior to check-in, end-users with advanced 
privileges can give discounts to the selected rate of any booking, either as a 
percentage of the nightly rate or as a set amount. The system then prompts the end-
user to indicate who authorized this discount and what for. For example, if the 
nightly rate is £100, a privileged end-user can give a 100% discount for every night 
included in this booking, as long as they indicate who was the more senior member 
of staff that granted them the right to do it and for what reason. The offender can 
make considerable profit; if they receive a payment in cash on the day of check-in, 
give a hand-written receipt instead of the standard one that is generated by the 
system, keep the cash, discount the rates and then settle an amount lower than the 
original balance, they get away with pocketing the difference. So, even if the guest is 
given a receipt, the offender can still commit the fraud, unless the receipt has been 
generated by the system. Insufficient controls can cost a lot of money to the hotel in 
this scenario. One major problem with this fraud is the commission paid to agents. If 
the offender is giving discounts to non-direct bookings, namely to bookings that have 
been made through OTAs, then there will be a discrepancy between the commission 
that the hotel was expecting to be invoiced for and the actual amount of money they 
are going to be invoiced by OTAs, which will be higher – so, the hotel suffers from 
the cash theft, but also from the loss of revenue, which is sometimes difficult to 
pinpoint.  
 
Another version of rate manipulation that is even more difficult to detect also occurs 
when privileged end-users change the ‘room type to charge’ field on a booking; and 
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so, instead of double or triple, they charge the guest a single room, without them 
knowing. In this context, the crime script for the second scenario is the following 
(see Fig. 4). 
 
Stage Script Action Situational Control 
Preparation 
Deliberately gaining 
access to the organisation 
Pre-employment screening 
Entry Authorised as employee - 
Pre-condition 
Look for cash bookings 
Advanced user privileges 
Better screening of who gets 
advanced privileges and why. 
Periodic review of all users with 
high user privileges. 
Instrumental pre-
condition 
Check for cash booking 
not associated with OTAs; 
process check-in of these 
bookings 
- 
Instrumental initiation 
Access the reservations 
system 
Password use for performing 
certain actions in the system 
Instrumental 
actualization 
Apply discount to nightly 
rates; receive cash 
payment 
Password required for performing 
this action; system prompting the 
user to indicate authorizer; senior 
staff has to approve the discounts 
Doing 
Keep the amount of cash 
that is not going to be 
settled on the system 
- 
Post-condition 
Put the amount of cash 
settled on the system (if 
any) in an envelope and 
in the hotel’s drop safe 
Amount has to be double-checked 
and signed for by a colleague 
Exit Log out of system  
Random checks for irregularities 
in rates or OTA invoices 
Fig. 4: Crime script for rate manipulation scenario 
Adapted from: (Willison and Backhouse, 2006) 
 
Scenario no.3 
The third scenario is the most sophisticated of the three, has relatively high rewards 
and a moderate to low risk, and is based on the routing of charges. Routing refers to 
the ability to route charges from one room to another for certain (or all) charges in a 
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given period. Charges can be automatically separated on a guest’s folio, or can be 
moved off the guest’s folio altogether to another guest room or a Posting Master 
(PM). The idea behind this scenario is relatively more complex. A privileged user 
roots (transfers) the charges of one room to a PM (virtual) room. The guest makes a 
payment in cash and gets a receipt for the payment. Then, the offender pockets the 
cash and either applies a negative posting to the PM room, or leaves the PM as is 
with an outstanding balance. PM rooms are mostly used as ‘buffers’ for group 
bookings in conjunction with A/R accounts – charges are being temporarily 
transferred to them for a variety of legitimate reasons that facilitate the day-to-day 
business; in this respect, it is normal for them to carry occasional negative postings 
and/or outstanding balances. So, no red flags there. The existence of a rooting is 
indicated in the booking profile and it is clearly visible to anyone who is accessing the 
booking for whatever reason. However, it can be deleted as easily as it is established, 
after the fraud has come full circle. The crime script for the third scenario should 
read as follows (see Fig. 5). 
 
Stage Script Action Situational Control 
Preparation 
Deliberately gaining 
access to the 
organization 
Pre-employment screening 
Entry 
Authorised as 
employee 
- 
Pre-condition 
Look for cash bookings 
Advanced user 
privileges 
Better screening of who gets 
advanced privileges and why. 
Periodic review of all users 
with high user privileges. 
Instrumental pre-
condition 
Check for cash 
bookings  
- 
Instrumental initiation 
Access the reservations 
system 
Password use for performing 
certain actions in the system 
Instrumental 
actualization 
Set up routing to PM 
room; receive cash 
payment 
Password required for 
performing this action 
Doing 
Keep the amount of 
cash that is not going to 
- 
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be settled on the 
system 
Post-condition 
Put the amount of cash 
settled on the system 
(if any) in an envelope 
and in the hotel’s drop 
safe; delete routing 
Amount has to be double-
checked and signed for by a 
colleague 
Exit Log out of system  
Random checks for 
irregularities in routings 
Fig. 5: Crime script for routing scenario 
Adapted from: (Willison and Backhouse, 2006) 
 
Drawing on RAA, the following section discusses the findings from the three crime 
scripts that were presented in the current section and raises wider issues and 
concerns relating to information security. 
 
5. Discussion and analysis 
Notwithstanding their recognised contribution to the improvement of crime 
prevention, RAA, SCP and all the other theoretical frameworks that are adopted in 
cyber-crime science (Hartel et al., 2010) are inherently insufficient to address fraud 
fully, which is ultimately a complex social phenomenon that often unfolds in the 
most unimaginable ways (Kroll, 2012). Theory involves categories, and categories 
lead to a permanent production of blind spots (Luhmann, 2002). However, certain 
important issues and concerns are raised even from a purely theoretical 
consideration of insider threat and fraud, and despite the fact that the scope of this 
paper is rather limited to computer-assisted cash fraud in a hospitality environment. 
 
The thought experiment presented in this paper shows an assortment of possible 
and, most worryingly, feasible cash fraud schemes in a hospitality environment. The 
findings are in line with, and supported by, much of the literature on insider threat 
and fraud. An indicative example of this is the recent study on cyber fraud in the U.S. 
financial services sector conducted by the Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) of the Insider Threat Center at Carnegie Mellon University (Cummings et al., 
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2012). The following list integrates the main points that can be derived from the 
thought experiment with most of the findings of the CERT study (ibid): 
- Scenarios no. 2 and 3 favour a ‘low and slow’ approach, which can lead to more 
damage and escape detection for longer; 
- All scenarios are not very technically sophisticated. No programming or hacking 
skills are necessary, besides an in-depth knowledge of the business model of the 
organisation, as well as a good grasp of certain aspects of the logical model of 
the computerised system;  
- The most serious threat comes from users with privileged access and/or a 
managerial position. Managers have the power to alter business processes and 
manipulate subordinate employees; 
- In scenarios no. 2 and 3, fraud can be uncovered only by random audits, a co-
worker suspicion, or a customer complaint (when a customer files a formal 
complaint for not getting a receipt for their payment). 
 
Following the examination of each scenario and its respective crime script under the 
theoretical lens of RAA, a few points need to be raised further. Whilst it is fairly 
reasonable to assume that there always will be motivated offenders in organisations, 
the same does not apply for suitable targets, namely opportunities for crime, or 
absent guardians. The crime scripts suggest that opportunities for insider fraud 
relate to the disharmonies often found in the technical, formal and informal aspects 
of the systemic integrity of an organisation (Samonas, 2012).  
 
Technical opportunities typically arise from lax rules or inconsistencies in the 
computerised bureaucracy of information systems (Angell and Samonas, 2009; 
Samonas and Angell, 2010; Samonas, 2012). Looking at the hospitality industry in 
particular, modern state-of-art hotel revenue management systems can adequately 
manage enormous volume of reservations and daily financial transactions, as well as 
multiple points-of-sale. However, they simply cannot prevent fraud at all levels. 
Hotels can easily get bogged down in customising the Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS) software they choose to use, and which is purportedly scalable to suit any 
size hotel and serve all segments of the market. Yet, the flexibility, modularity, and 
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scalability of this COTS software can turn from a promised business strength to an 
elusive weakness.  
 
Actually, it is not that rare for a poor or incomplete customisation and configuration 
of the software to happen, since it is an activity usually performed in haste, and in 
certain cases, with minimal resources to hand (Samonas, 2012). In this respect, 
opportunities for crime arise from the technical deficiencies that are created when 
something falls through the cracks during the extensive customisation of the 
software. For example, the easiness with which routing is created and then deleted 
to cover the tracks of the fraudster in scenario no. 3 is clearly the result of poor 
configuration of the system. 
 
Quite evidently, opportunities at the formal level of the organisation refer to 
organisational procedures and processes; but also to rule following and compliance – 
an issue that touches upon the creation of opportunities for crime at the informal 
level. One fine example of this category of opportunities is the management of 
access control. Besides its purely technical considerations, the management of end-
user privileges is an extremely delicate and important matter. Privileges tend to 
accumulate over time as employees change departments and accept new job 
responsibilities (Cummings et al., 2012).  
 
In scenario no. 1, negative postings can only be performed by end-users who have 
been granted advanced use privileges, not by receptionists or other temporary 
employees. This is a fair and appropriate measure, which, however, can be 
subverted when managers bypass the standard procedure for granting higher access 
privileges to some of their employees. Busy managers can easily fall into the trap of 
disclosing their password to a subordinate employee who is willing to take some of 
their manager’s workload. Having in mind what is best for the day-to-day business 
and/or their partial relief from certain repetitive tasks, managers may abuse their 
power and make all the necessary arrangements for an end-user to be given higher 
privileges, without taking into account what are the standard requirements in such a 
case. Adding another aspect to this, Dhillon et al (2001) note that employees from 
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certain cultures may be keen on putting faith in personal relationships at the 
expense of company procedures.  
 
But even when privileges are granted for all the right reasons, it is imperative for the 
organisation to establish periodic checks and reassessments on how these privileges 
have been allocated and are being used. Otherwise, the effectiveness of the 
measure will be incomplete and will allow malicious employees to take undue 
advantage of their position. So, when a crime occurs, the guardians are not 
necessarily absent, as RAA assumes; it is quite possible that the guardians are 
present, but blind. The blindness of the guardians primarily stems from the 
organisational complacency towards information security or even the erroneous 
perceptions of information security risks (Willison and Backhouse, 2006); however, 
this blindness may also be the result of an orchestrated insider attack against the 
organisations nerve centre. The ‘zero balance trap’ is an indicative example of the 
former case. In their effort to battle through augmented daily workloads, 
organisations often overlook certain controls, thus allowing the rise of opportunities 
for crime. The latter case is extremely serious and may involve elements of industrial 
espionage and/or sabotage (Kroll, 2013).  
 
The revisiting of end-user privileges also brings about issues pertaining to trust – 
which opens up an array of possibilities for insider fraud. Whenever computerised 
bureaucracy is hindering certain aspects of the normal operation of an organisation, 
trust is instrumental in providing employees with discretionary powers to act 
independently and improvise in order to sufficiently address ‘irregular’ situations 
(Angell and Samonas, 2009; Samonas and Angell, 2010; Samonas, 2012). However, 
trust is a double-edged sword (Samonas and Angell, 2010; Samonas, 2012), 
especially if it is granted without adequate supervision (Dhillon and Moores, 2001). 
In scenario no. 1, for instance, a Front-of-House manager could fairly easily abuse 
the powers entrusted to him by defrauding through ‘salami slicing’; namely, by 
applying negative postings to certain cash bookings, and then signing off these 
postings as necessary, making sure to back everything up with a fictional story about 
a ‘difficult’ guest. In the context of a computer crime case study, Dhillon et al (2004) 
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advocate the merits of trust and argue that when trust is replaced by control, the 
organisation will experience some sort of disruption.  
 
The various internal controls and other audit mechanisms that are used in modern 
organisations can achieve their potential only when organisations realise the inter-
related nature of controls (Willison and Backhouse, 2006), and strike the right 
balance between technical, formal and informal controls (Dhillon and Moores, 2001; 
Dhillon et al., 2004). To this end, almost a decade ago Dhillon et al (2004) were 
calling for more pragmatic measures to be built on good management practices and 
trust-based communication, which encourages individuals to take responsibility for 
their actions. In the past 15 years the relevant literature has provided a variety of 
recommendations for the prevention, detection and deterrence against insider 
threat and insider fraud. To a greater or lesser extent, these recommendations have 
been gradually integrated into information security standards, such as the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International 
Electrotechnical Commission’s (IEC’s) standard 27002 (ISO/IEC 27002), the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST’s) Special Publication 800-53, or the 
CERT Resilience Management Model (CERT-RMM). In the ‘Common Sense Guide to 
Mitigating Insider Threats’, Silowash et al (2012) present 19 best practices to 
mitigating insider threats and take the painstaking effort to map these practices to 
the ISO/IEC 27002, the NIST SP 800-53 and the CERT-RMM.  
 
However, despite all this knowledge and expertise on information security, E&Y 
speaks of a great gap between the actual and the desirable levels of security in 
modern organisations, and identifies the high velocity of change in cyber-crime as 
one of the main cause for this, among others. In order to understand fraud and take 
meaningful measures to prevent it, security professionals and policy makers need to 
get into the offender’s shoes, as much as possible – they need to think like an 
offender. Fraudsters are usually creative when it comes to plotting a fraud, and they 
generally possess an abundance of skills, knowledge, resources, authority, and 
motive (Warkentin and Willison, 2009). This is vividly illustrated in ancient Greece. A 
plethora of references that revolve around Metis, the Goddess of wisdom and 
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cunning thought, can be found in Greek mythology; and so, fraud has been around 
for thousands of years. In the concept of metis, which was heavily practiced by 
mortals and Gods, ancient Greeks encapsulated “a form of intelligence that applied 
to a wide range of practical activity”; they used the very same term to express 
“intellectual behaviors, combining flair, savvy, alert anticipation, flexibility of mind, 
feint, resourcefulness, prudence, a sense of opportunity, diverse skills and patiently 
acquired expertise” (Klein, 1986).  
 
In the case of computer-assisted insider fraud, insiders are not only aware of the 
policies, procedures, and technology of their organization; they are also aware of the 
organization’s vulnerabilities at a technical, formal and informal level (Hartel et al., 
2010; Silowash et al., 2012). Information security professionals and policy makers are 
struggling to think like a fraudster, when the reverse is true; motivated offenders are 
more likely to be successful when trying to think like law enforcers. And there seems 
to be a lag between the manifestations of these two lines of thought; fraudsters are 
not always smarter, but they are definitely faster in keeping up with constant 
change, in changing their colours and blending in with the environment – and in this 
respect, they should be treated as leaders rather than followers. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Connoly et al (Connolly and Haley, 2008) have argued that the hospitality firm of the 
future should be “flexible, agile, and aggressive by reducing bureaucracy and 
formalization and by being more open to risk and innovation”; this was, indeed, 
excellent advice for any organization, not just hospitality firms. Five years later, this 
sounds like wishful thinking. Despite the bleak picture that is being painted by 
external and internal threats, complacency about security is gaining momentum 
(Hartford, 2012; Kroll, 2012). Some organizations are clearly striving for failure 
(Ciborra, 2000, 2002), thinking that they are covering all the bases, when, in fact, 
they cover relatively few. They are shortsighted and thrive on a belief that 
everything is working well, ignoring the potential detrimental consequences of their 
actions; they are inviting a major security breach that will ‘scar’ them and make 
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them operate in a ‘reactive mode’ that will essentially lead to more insecurity and 
anxiety (Dhillon et al., 2004; Samonas, 2012). 
 
The obvious way to deal with the insider threat and fraud is perhaps more control. 
However, although technology is designed to control uncertainty, it actually creates 
“new and riskier contingencies” than the ones it was originally supposed to deal with 
(Kallinikos, 2006, 2007); in this respect, more control is less. Willison et al (2006) 
argue that one of the longstanding problems of information security is its alignment 
with business objectives. The reasonable need of organizations to mitigate risks that 
are pertinent to information security ends up getting misunderstood by employees, 
who quite often treat controls, risk countermeasures and other safeguards as a 
constraint that they need to circumvent to make their day-to-day work easier 
(Samonas, 2012; Willison and Backhouse, 2006).  
 
In a similar vein, information security professionals also argue that a heavy 
investment on information security can have an adverse effect on business, leading 
to inefficiencies and loss in productivity (Cowan, 2012). As Cowan notes (2012), it is a 
battle between security and productivity; security measures must neither be so 
restrictive that they affect business processes and the flow of information, nor too 
relaxed, thereby causing harm. Nevertheless, disobedience and non-compliance, 
regardless of where and how they come from, can only create more windows of 
opportunity for crime; and so, the safeguards are actually introducing risks instead of 
addressing them (Willison and Backhouse, 2006). Slightly paraphrasing the lyrics of a 
famous Queen song “too much love will kill you”: “too much security will kill you – 
just as sure as none at all”. 
 
Every organisation is in some way unique and faces different kinds and levels of 
exposure to insider threat and fraud. And the only way to address this variety is with 
a variety of appropriate actions (Ashby, 1958). There is no panacea for the threat of 
insiders and the constantly rising opportunities for crime; but most of all, there is no 
such thing as complete security and total peace of mind. It is encouraging to see that 
information security scholars and practitioners urge organisations to be truly 
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pragmatic and abandon their grandiose plans that often lead to complacency (Booz, 
2011), deficient security and exposure to even more risk. Information security 
involves people, and for this reason alone, it is destined to thrive only on bespoke 
solutions that carefully consider the hazards and weaknesses, the strengths and the 
opportunities for growth; and, of course, hope for the best. 
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